USCG Bounty Hearings

[Ray Frechette Jr]

Great Quote;

 

 

"Walbridge often addressed his crew as “Future captains of America.”  They all speak of Bounty as a great place to learn and as a school where they would learn from the master, Robin Walbridge.  They were “honored to work for him.”  But there has been a theme in the testimony that  ”getting better” on Bounty was a substitute for good enough to begin with.  The organization didn’t seem to care how little you knew about your job – so long as you were willing to get better, everything was just fine.  The sea doesn’t see it that way."

 

http://gcaptain.com/bounty-hearings-chief-mates-testifies/

 

8 part series, lots to learn and gain from reading all 8 parts.

 

I know some of the people in this story too.  Waaay too sad and stupid!

 

My son really wanted to crew on the Bounty.  I am making him read thsi entire series before crewing on any ship so he knows what questions to ask before putting his life int he hands of a Captain and "a cluelessly" fearless crew.

[ecgossett]

This is a cautionary tale for all of us, and realizing what our actual abilities are when it comes to bad weather or dangerous things.

[PAR]

There are several places online where you can follow the discussion about this event and also the history of the vessel. Bounty was poorly managed most of her life, especially under Tuner's ownership and the resulting negligence in her maintenance routine, to address issues suffered as well. I'm surprised she lasted as long as she did and thought she'd have sunk during the Turner years (she almost did more than once). It was hoped that new ownership would bring the needed upgrades and repairs, but she also needed to pay for her way in the process and she was well behind in this regard. She was always in need of serious repair and maintenance, so an eventual summation equaling a catastrophic event, isn't much of a stretch for a large vessel, kept in this manner.

 

Some of the recent testimony and published comments by former and surviving crew, leave a less than accurate description of the vessel. Most recently the machinist aboard during the sinking made comments out of his purview, as well as some about the mechanical state of the ship. Speculation of crew members, who may or may not have a complete grasp on the vessel's overall maintenance requirements is just uninformed folly and nearly worthless in hindsight.

It's a sin she was lost, but it's not a surprise and was likely well over due, even if you count luck. The person ultimately responsible, paid a complete price.

[Joe Anderson]

Thanks Ray for the interesting if disturbing link. It is a reminder to me that in many activities we are responsible for the well being of others. From driving a car to sailing our boat. It is easy to become complacent about routine activities that are inherently dangerous but feel safe because of their familiarity.

 

A few months ago a friend who volunteers with the Coast Guard Auxiliary was looking at my boat with me. Later he sent me a link to their web site. http://cgaux.org

 

I printed out some float plans from the site and found a lot of useful information.

 

Joe

[Ray Frechette Jr]

The point I found amongst the most compelling here was that the crew all felt they had great training and Walbridge was a genius etc. 

 

People were impressed with his 20 year history captaining vessels.  And impressed with his knowledge of ship repair and maintenance but had nothing to compare it too.

 

My son had wanted to crew on Bounty last year and I had qualms with the idea.  I had toured Bounty and was aghast at seeing a tree grow out of the side of the ship.

 

Having read this piece I now know a whole lot more questions I would want answered before giving my blessing to his crewing on a tall ship.

 

I would be very reluctant to ever ship out as crew on any vessel liscensced by USCG only as a Dockside attraction vessel.

 

I would want to look throught he ships maintenance log.

 

I would definitely question the credentials and experience of the Mates, Engineer and Bosun. Any hesitation or vagueness to these questions would leave me standing on solid ground.

 

And I sure would look to see where the Bilge discharge was and take a look at how often and for how long the pumps were running.

 

20 minutes every 2-4 hours??  Come on!

 

And if ever a Captaoin was wanting to take the vessel out to sea to be safer when a major storm was brewing, I would get off as quickly as possible.

[PAR]

Actually the skipper's decision to take to sea was a sound one. His "inside route" was also a sound one (practiced by many), given the time he made this decision, which was before the European forecast models, had Sandy turning to the west. American forecast models, were several days behind the European models, but he still knew in time to make a course adjustment, which he did. Unfortunately, and with most catastrophic events such as these, an inescapable set of difficulties arose, of which no good end was foreseeable. We see this a lot in accident investigation and it's a culmination of problems and/or incidents, that in themselves seem minor, but conspire with other issues and situations, to make an intractable outcome. Once he'd made his course change, the cascade of failures enveloped the vessel and ultimately the decision making process. At this point, had he put to port, the ship would have been lost anyway, in hindsight, knowing where Sandy landed.

 

It's precisely this possibility/probability, that owners of aircraft and other sea going vessels establish regular maintenance programs and consumable replacement practices. You can get away with the "replace it when it breaks" approach with an 18' runabout, but there's just way too much to keep track of on a larger vessel, so a methodical almost ruthless approach has to be adopted. You pull and replace a part, even though it's still working, knowing it's at the end of it's life cycle. Some to save money, might keep this part as a emergency spare, knowing they might be able to limp home with it, but the wise ship's "chief" would toss or sell the part.

 

It's sad what happened to Bounty and her crew, but again, not unexpected, once everything is considered. You were wise to hem and haw with your son's desires Ray. Though 20 minutes every 3 or 4 hours wouldn't be considered unusual for a vessel of this build method and age, particularly knowing her general condition, but other clues would stand out, many of which I'm sure you would have picked up on too. Columbus crossed the Atlantic with guys on the pumps for 10 minutes or more every hour! When they arrived in the Caribbean, they where over a 1/4 hour on the pumps, every hour. More modern carvel square riggers are a little better, but not much. In short, a few minutes per hour isn't much of a concern, unless the time is increasing.

 

In hindsight it's easy to say he should have just headed out toward the Flemish Cap, letting Sanding die on the east coast, under him, but US forecast models (at that time) still had Sandy turning east up the western side of the Atlantic, so this wouldn't have been the safest route. I'm sure this was his logic for the inside passage and also kept him within the USCG's rescue range, just in case. It was this experience and decision that saved the crew after all.

[Ray Frechette Jr]

20 minutes avery 2-4 hours really depends on the capacity of the pumps though doesn't it?  In any event 20 minutes every 2-4 hours when at dock and not working insa sea waysis a lot different than 2-4 hours when at sea under press of sail in 6-8 foot seas. too.

 

Going out to sea might be argued to be safer for the vessel,  but there is no question  that the crew would have been safer in a hotel ashore  on high ground.

[PAR]

Ray you just hit the point of responsibility that the skipper was negligent about. The primary job of the skipper is ship and crew. By not electing to fall off on a port tack and make a port, once the American and European forecast models showed the westward track of Sandy, he forced a failing vessel into a no win scenario. Had he falling off and made port, the vessel would have likely been lost, but the crew would have likely been ashore. He hoped he could "duck under" and get the the south west corner of the storm before it turned left. He was only off by a few hours, but at that point the ship was all but helpless. Had he been able to get his generators back up, he stood a modest chance of success, but other portions of the continuing "cascade of errors" where piling up, which doomed the attempt.